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Abstract 
We examine the reliability of analysts’ stock recommendations issued for Italian listed firms by exploring 
absolute stock returns. Research findings reveal that absolute stock returns following recommendations differ 
depending on whether they are positive, neutral or negative recommendations, but slightly more than fifty 
percent of recommendations are confirmed by absolute stock returns. On the basis of the logistic regression 
model, we also document that the reliability of stock recommendations is inversely connected to the uncertainty 
faced by investors who hold stocks in a specific firm, as suggested by the estimate of explanatory variables, such 
as the firm’s beta, the interest coverage ratio and cash flow volatility.   
Keywords: stock recommendations, absolute stock returns, financial analysts, Italian listed firms, forecast 
accuracy  
1. Introduction 
Stock recommendations published by brokerage houses provide a rare opportunity for examining an unequivocal 
course of action (Elton, Gruber, & Grossman, 1986). Although stock recommendations are officially distributed 
to professional investors, there is no doubt that stock rating systems used by brokerage houses, such as “Buy” or 
“Sell” recommendations, provide a clear indication for investment decisions. Nonprofessional investors can be 
particularly subject to recommendations of financial analysts. The limited skills of some investors have been 
underlined by several studies which have shown that small investors tend to take recommendations literally 
(Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2007) and respond merely to the issuance of stock recommendations (Mikhail, 
Walther, & Willis, 2007). Such rating systems implicitly assume the existence of unsophisticated investors since 
professional investors are more interested in information rather than recommendations. Two main questions 
related to this topic are addressed in this paper. 
First, do absolute stock returns confirm stock recommendations? Unlike the methodologies used by previous 
research, we use the absolute stock return to assess the reliability of analysts’ stock recommendations issued by 
brokerage houses. To illustrate the relevance of absolute stock returns, assume that the return on a stock for a 
period of one year is -5%. If the return of the market is -7%, the stock would have an ex post abnormal return of 
2%. The positive abnormal return of 2% certainly does not meet the expectations of some investors since the 
absolute stock return of -5% could be lower than the required return of other investments with similar risks and 
certainly lower than the return on an investment with no risk of financial loss. Similarly, if the annual return on a 
stock is 12% and the return of the market is 14%, the stock would have an ex post abnormal return of -2%. The 
absolute stock return of 12% could, however, be higher than the required return of other investments with similar 
risks. The analysis of absolute stock returns can facilitate the decision-making of investors who are not interested 
and/or do not have the expertise and resources for measuring stock returns on the basis of various indicators, 
such as the abnormal stock return, calculated by subtracting market performances or other benchmarks from a 
single stock or portfolio return. For the purposes of this study, we called this type of private or business investors 
“nonprofessional and unsophisticated investors” (hereafter, unsophisticated investors).  
Second, which firm-specific characteristics can explain the reliability of stock recommendations? The level of 
reliability of stock recommendations for each company should presumably vary because of the many 
circumstances that can affect analysts’ forecasts. We highlight this issue by examining the role of various 
explanatory variables, including some firm-specific characteristics. In particular, without formulating a priori 
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specific hypotheses, we assume the existence of relationships between the reliability of stock recommendations 
and some stock market indicators, proxies of financial risk, firm size and firm profitability. Using a sample of 
5,443 analysts’ stock recommendations issued for Italian listed firms, empirical tests revealed the existence of a 
significant negative correlation between the level of reliability for each firm of our sample and the firms’ beta. 
Our findings indicate also a positive correlation between the level of reliability of a subsample of 130 
non-financial firms and the interest coverage ratio, whilst a negative association was found between the level of 
reliability and cash flow volatility. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: the second section presents a brief review of the related 
literature, the third section describes how the firm sample was selected and the survey methodology; the fourth 
section reports on the results; the last section provides some concluding remarks.  
2. Literature Review 
A large number of studies have examined the extent of the impact of buy and sell recommendations on stock 
prices in order to investigate capital market efficiency. Although some researchers have suggested that investors 
cannot benefit from analysts’ recommendations (e.g., Logue & Tuttle, 1973; Bidwell, 1977; Menendez-Requejo, 
2005; Erdogan, Palmon, & Yezegel, 2011), numerous analyses have documented a significant price reaction to 
stock recommendations by exploring the existence of abnormal stock returns (Womack, 1996; Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, & Trueman, 2001; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & Lee, 2004; Lidèn, 2007). Several specific aspects of 
this issue have been addressed, such as stock price reactions to recommendation revisions (Ivković & Jegadeesh, 
2004; Elton, Gruber, & Grossman., 1986; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006; Chang & Chan, 2008), the difference 
between returns on initiating and continuing recommendations (Chan, Brown, & Ho, 2006), abnormal returns 
subsequent to stock recommendations released to a limited clientele (Schlumpf, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2008), 
stock rating distributions over time for the prediction of future recommendations (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, & 
Trueman, 2006) and various determinants of stock recommendations that affect price performance, including the 
strength of the recommendation, the analysts’ reputations and the size of the brokerage house (Stickel, 1995). 
Research literature have furthermore explored effects of stock recommendations on different phenomena, such as 
brokerage firm trading (Irvine, 2004), earnings management (Abaranell & Lehavy, 2003) and the tendency of 
analysts to follow consensus forecasts according to the “herd behaviour” phenomenon (Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010; 
Lin, Chen, & Chen, 2011). Although several aspects of market reactions and other effects of stock 
recommendations have been analyzed, the absolute stock return that follows recommendations published by 
brokerage houses remains largely unexplored.  
Similarly, there has been little discussion about how the reliability of stock recommendations is affected by 
firm-specific characteristics. In particular, two main research areas related to this topic have been explored by 
empirical studies. First, numerous analyses have examined the impact of several factors on earning forecast 
accuracy rather than on stock recommendations. To name just a few, the issue has been examined by exploring 
how the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts has been affected by a change of chief executive officer (Choi, 
Chen, Wright, & Wu, 2014), the model of reporting firms’ primary operating assets (Liang & Riedl, 2014), the 
geographical proximity of financial analysts to hubs of information (Cavezzali, Crepaldi, & Rigoni, 2014), 
investor expectations (Walther, 2013), strategic patterns of internationalization (Mauri, Lin, & De Figueiredo, 
2013), non-financial disclosure (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012), CEO stock options 
(Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2012), change in the composition and ability of analysts (Nowland & Simon, 
2010), the affiliation of analysts to investment banks or to other institutions (Jacob, Rock, & Weber, 2008) and 
corporate transparency (Chiang & Chia, 2005). And, more closely related to our study, some researchers have 
examined how firm-specific characteristics affect the accuracy of earnings forecasts. In particular, Parkash, 
Dhaliwal and Salatka (1995) suggested that the accuracy of earnings forecast is positively associated with the 
proxies of business risk, financial risk and ownership concentration and negatively correlated to the information 
index of the firm, measured by firm size and the number of analysts studying a firm. Moreover, Jaggi and Jain 
(1998) found that earnings forecasts are more accurate with short time horizons and that the beta coefficient and 
industry classification do not have a significant explanatory power on the accuracy of analyst forecasts.  
Second, stock recommendations have been expressly analysed in connection with phenomena that are only 
marginally related to our research questions. In particular, an issue that has dominated the field concerns how 
earning forecasts are reflected in stock recommendations. Although several studies have highlighted the 
existence of a positive influence especially for long-term forecasts (e.g., Bandyopadhyay, Brown, & Richardson, 
1995; Lustgarten & Tag, 2008; Bradshaw, 2002; Chen & Chen, 2009; Loh, & Mian, 2006), it was also found that 
there is little evidence that stock recommendations and earnings forecasts are related to each other (e.g., Francis 
& Soffer, 1997; Bradshaw, 2004; Barniv, Hope, Myring, & Thomas, 2010). The association between earnings 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 7, No. 9; 2015 
315 
forecasts and recommendations has also been studied in the presence of some determinants such as analysts’ 
conflict of interest and analysts’ expertise (Ertimur, Sunder, & Sunder, 2008). Other factors have been analysed 
in connection with stock recommendations, such as the type of analysts’ affiliation (Lin & McNichols, 1998; 
Michaely & Womak, 1999), the conflict of interest between a proprietary trading division and a brokerage 
division (Shen & Chih, 2009), the role of analyst optimism (Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler, & Agarwal, 2009) and 
the investor sentiment (Bagnoli, Clement, Crawley, & Watts, 2009).  
3. Firm Sample and Methodology 
The sample examined in this study contains 5,443 stock recommendations issued for 154 companies listed on the 
Italian stock exchange (Borsa Italiana) between 2009 and 2013. Stock recommendations, except in a few cases, 
are written in English and were downloaded directly from the Italian stock exchange’s website (Borsa Italiana, 
2014) and individually analyzed. More specifically, the sample selection was made on the basis of the following 
criteria. Firms were included in the sample if brokerage houses covered each company for at least three years in 
the period between 2009 and 2013. 161 firms did not match this criterion, of which 53 companies were not rated 
and 108 companies were not covered sufficiently over the period 2009-2013. By examining the stock 
recommendations individually, the analysts’ ratings were classified into three main groups: positive 
recommendations (buy, outperform, accumulate, add, underweight, undervalued), neutral recommendations 
(neutral, hold, in line) and negative recommendations (sell, underperform, reduce). Table 1 shows the sample of 
stock recommendations according to the above-mentioned classification criteria.  
 
Table 1. Sample of stock recommendations 
Years Positive Neutral Negative Total 
 Unit % Unit % Unit % Unit 
2013 476 58.05% 258 31.46% 86 10.49% 820 
2012 670 64.49% 297 28.59% 72 6.93% 1039 
2011 802 63.30% 366 28.89% 99 7.81% 1267 
2010 644 60.02% 331 30.85% 98 9.13% 1073 
2009 648 52.09% 447 35.93% 149 11.98% 1244 
Total 3240  1699  504  5443 
 
In order to ascertain the ability of stock recommendations to predict stock prices, the present paper compared 
analysts’ ratings with the absolute stock returns. More specifically, for each stock recommendation, the analysis 
was articulated on the basis of the following stages. First, we calculated the average stock price M0 for five days 
around the date of publication t = 0 of each stock recommendation, from day t = −2 to day t = 2. Second, we 
computed the average stock price M1 from the day of publication t = 0 to the day of the subsequent stock 
recommendation provided by the same brokerage house. If the subsequent recommendation was absent, the 
average was calculated over a period of twelve months or for a shorter period if stock prices were not available. 
Third, we computed the absolute stock returns as (M1-M0)/M0 in order to verify whether the positive and the 
negative stock recommendations were confirmed by stock returns. More specifically, stock recommendations 
were considered reliable if (M1-M0)/M0>0 for positive recommendations and (M1-M0)/M0<0 for negative 
recommendations. We did not consider stock recommendations classified as “neutral” since their information 
content does not provide a clear indication for the future stock price.  
The ability of stock recommendations to predict stock prices over the period 2009-2013 allows us to identify a 
level of reliability for each firm. The level of reliability was obtained by dividing the number of reliable positive 
and negative recommendations for a firm by the total number of positive and negative recommendations issued 
for the same firm. The level of reliability LRi is formally described as: 
𝐿𝑅𝑖 = (𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑖 + 𝑅𝑁𝑅𝑖) (𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑖 + 𝑇𝑁𝑅𝑖)⁄                          (1) 
where RPRi is the number of reliable positive recommendations, RNRi is the number of reliable negative 
recommendations, TPRi is the total number of positive recommendations and TNRi is the total number of 
negative recommendations issued for each firm.  
The correlation between the level of reliability of stock recommendations and some potential explanatory 
variables was therefore tested using the logistic regression model. More specifically, this study has divided the 
firm sample into two groups: firms which have stock recommendations with a high level of reliability and firms 
which have recommendations with a low level of reliability. We supposed that firms belonging to the first group 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 7, No. 9; 2015 
316 
are above the median of the level of reliability, whilst firms of the second group are below the median. This 
paper assumes the binary dependent variable Y (firms with reliable stock recommendations Y=1; firms with 
unreliable stock recommendations Y=0) and several average market indicators and financial ratios over the 
period 2009-2013 as independent variables xp using the logistic regression model. Assuming p = P(Y=1), the 
model has the following general form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) = log(𝑝/(1 − 𝑝)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2+. . . +𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝                   (2) 
where log(p/(1-p)) is the natural logarithm of the odds, p is the probability between 0 and 1 that the dependent 
variable occurs, βp is the pth parameter of the logistic regression model obtained by the method of maximum 
likelihood and xp is the pth explanatory variable. 
According to this procedure, three main sets of explanatory variables were examined. The first set is derived 
from stock markets: the logarithm of the daily average stock trading volume (LogSTV) for the period covered by 
brokerage houses, the firm’s beta (Beta) and the number of analysts that covered each firm (NA). The number of 
analysts can be used as proxy of the amount of information available about a firm (Parkash, Dhaliwal, & Salatka, 
1995; Ertimur, Sunder, & Sunder, 2007) and therefore interpreted as a factor that could reduce ceteris paribus 
the uncertainty faced by investors who hold stocks in a specific firm.  
The second group of variables are proxies of firm size and profitability. We used the average value of the 
following variables for the period covered by brokerage houses: the logarithm of book value of total assets 
(LogTA), the return on assets ratio (ROA) and the market to book ratio (MB). To avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity, we excluded measures of firm profitability from our model, such as ROS (return on sale), ROI 
(return on investment), ROTA (EBIT to total assets) and the asset turnover ratio (revenues to assets). As in the 
aforementioned case of the number of analysts covering the company, proxies of firm size have also been 
considered by some studies as factors that increase the amount of information available about a firm (for 
example, Atiase, 1985; Brushan, 1989; Kasznik & Lev, 1995; Parkash, Dhaliwal, & Salatka, 1995).  
Lastly, as proxies of financial risk, we considered the total debt to total assets ratio (DtoA), EBIT to interest 
expenses also known as the interest coverage ratio (ICR) and cash flow volatility (CFV). Cash flow volatility 
was computed as the coefficient of variation of cash flow obtained by dividing the standard deviation by the 
mean of annual cash flow from operations for the period 2009-2013 or, if not available, for a shorter period.  
Data relating to the number of analysts were collected from the Italian stock exchange (Borsa Italiana, 2014) 
whilst market data and fundamentals were obtained from the Thomson Reuters databank. 
In the first stage of the regression analysis, we used stock market indicators regardless of fundamentals in order 
to have a more homogeneous sample. In the second stage, the regression analysis was carried out using a 
subsample of 130 non-financial firms. Although raw data were collected over time, the correlation did not use 
time series data itself, but examined the reliability level of stock recommendations as defined in equation (1) and 
the average value of the above-mentioned explanatory variables in a cross-sectional regression. The correlation 
matrix of the variables examined is presented in Table 2. Panel A shows correlations of variables used in the first 
stage of the regression analysis related to the entire sample of 5,443 analysts’ stock recommendations for 154 
firms. Panel B presents correlations related to the subsample of 4,620 analysts’ stock recommendations for the 
130 non-financial firms. The results confirm the absence of the multicollinearity problem. The Variable Inflation 
Factor (VIF) was also used to test the multicollinearity. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix  
Panel A LogSTV Beta NA 
   
 VIF 
LogSTV 1 
  
    1.690 
Beta 0.3776 1 
 
    1.220 
NA 0.5278 0.0338 1     1.450 
         
Panel B ROA ICR CFV LogTA DtoA MB  VIF 
ROA 1 
     
 1.662 
ICR 0.5664 1 
    
 1.544 
CFV -0.0602 -0.0078 1 
   
 1.001 
LogTA 0.0678 -0.1168 -0.0288 1 
  
 1.153 
DtoA -0.3862 -0.3052 0.0195 0.2408 1 
 
 1.283 
MB 0.2018 0.2258 -0.0302 -0.187 -0.1853 1  1.103 
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4. Results 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of stock returns for the sample of 154 firms. Research 
findings revealed that the mean and the median of the absolute stock returns differ depending on whether they 
are positive, neutral or negative recommendations (respectively 1.74% and 0.75% for positive recommendations, 
1.23% and -0.21% for neutral recommendations, 0.64% and -0.49% for negative recommendations), whilst the 
values of standard deviation increased, with the highest value for negative recommendations. A possible 
explanation for these results is that stock recommendations can on average forecast stock prices and the 
predictions appear to be more accurate in the case of positive recommendations compared with negative 
recommendations, as suggested by the increasing value of standard deviations. Although these results validate 
the reliability of stock recommendations, only a part of the analysts’ forecasts is confirmed by stock returns. As 
shown in Panel B of Table 3, 55.1% of positive recommendations were able to forecast a positive stock return 
and 53% of negative recommendations predicted a negative stock return. It is quite obvious that these results 
reflect almost a random guess. Panel B of Table 3 provides more details about the frequency distribution of 
absolute stock returns. We also analysed the reliability level of stock recommendations for each firm as defined 
in equation (1). Table 4 shows the level of reliability for positive and/or negative stock recommendations for the 
whole sample of 154 firms. In particular, the reliability levels of the positive and negative stock 
recommendations are normally distributed around the mean of 54% whilst the median assumes a value of about 
55.5%. In line with the findings illustrated above, these results show that only 84 firms, about 55% of our firm 
sample, had a level of reliability greater than the mean.   
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of stock returns  
Panel A Stock recommendations 
 Positive Neutral Negative 
Stock returns:    
Mean 1.74% 1.23% 0.64% 
Median 0.75% -0.21% -0.49% 
St.Deviation 12.19% 15.40% 17.54% 
Panel B  Stock recommendations 
 Positive Neutral Negative 
 Unit % Cum %  Unit % Cum %  Unit % Cum % 
Stock returns:            
Less than (60%) 1 0.03%   2 0.12%   2 0.40%  
(60%)-(40%) 7 0.22%   5 0.29%   6 1.19%  
(40%)-(20%) 54 1.67%   58 3.41%   23 4.56%  
(20%)-(10%) 208 6.42%   152 8.95%   60 11.90%  
(10%)-0% 1185 36.57% 44.9%  661 38.91% 51.7%  176 34.92% 53% 
0%-10% 1340 41.36%   543 31.96%   145 28.77%  
10%-20% 301 9.29%   164 9.65%   49 9.72%  
20%-40% 112 3.46%   89 5.24%   33 6.55%  
40%-60% 18 0.56%   15 0.88%   4 0.79%  
60%-80% 6 0.19%   3 0.18%   3 0.60%  
More than 80% 8 0.25% 55.1%  7 0.41% 48.3%  3 0.60% 47% 
Total 3240 100% 100%  1699  100%  504  100% 
 
The regression analysis was therefore performed assuming the reliability level of the overall positive and 
negative stock recommendations computed for each firm according to equation (1) as the dependent variable 
(firms with reliable stock recommendations Y=1; firms with unreliable stock recommendations Y=0) and some 
average market indicators and financial ratios as explanatory variables. The results of logistic regression 
according to model (2) are shown in Table 5.   
The first step of the logistic regression focused on the average stock market indicators as defined in section 3. 
The research findings presented in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that the probability of having firms with reliable 
stock recommendations increases as the beta coefficient (Beta) decreases. The strong correlation suggests that 
volatility, measured by the firm’s beta, is a valid predictor of the accuracy of stock recommendations. The 
regression analysis did not reveal any statistical significance for the daily stock trading volume (LogSTV) and 
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the number of analysts that covered the firms (NA). The second step of the logistic regression involved the 
average financial ratios for the subsample of 130 non-financial firms. As shown in panel B of Table 5, the 
regression revealed the existence of a positive correlation between the level of reliability and the interest 
coverage ratio (ICR). In other words, the ability of firms to pay interest on outstanding debt with their revenues 
allows brokerage houses to provide more accurate stock recommendations. Furthermore, the regression analysis 
showed that the probability of having reliable stock recommendations increases as the cash flow volatility (CFV) 
decreases, as indicated by the negative value of the coefficient of variation of cash flow. 
 
Table 4. Reliability of stock recommendations 
 Stock recommendations 
 Positive Negative Positive and Negative 
 Firms % Firms % Firms % 
Level of reliability:       
0-10% 7 4.5% 12 7.8% 3 1.9% 
10%-20% 5 3.2% 1 0.6% 3 1.9% 
20%-30% 7 4.5% 5 3.2% 6 3.9% 
30%-40% 18 11.7% 5 3.2% 20 13.0% 
40%-50% 27 17.5% 11 7.1% 26 16.9% 
50%-60% 38 24.7% 9 5.8% 45 29.2% 
60%-70% 27 17.5% 6 3.9% 30 19.5% 
70%-80% 8 5.2% 3 1.9% 10 6.5% 
80%-90% 6 3.9% 2 1.3% 4 2.6% 
More 90% 5 3.2% 9 5.8% 5 3.2% 
n.a.* 6 3.9% 91 59.1% 2 1.3% 
Total 154  154  154  
Note. * Stock recommendations not available for the specified class of ratings.  
 
Table 5. Reliability of stock recommendations and regression results 
Panel A Estimate Std Error z value Pr(>│z│)  
Const 0.928842 0.467723 1.9859 0.04705 ** 
Log Stock trading volume (LogSTV) -0.0990498 0.200727 -0.4935 0.62169  
Beta coefficient (Beta) -1.08139 0.413396 -2.6159 0.00890 *** 
Number of analysts (NA) 0.0634223 0.0778028 0.8152 0.41498  
Panel B Estimate Std Error z value Pr(>│z│)  
Const 0.651638 0.887752 0.7340 0.46293  
Return on assets ratio (ROA) -0.448037 3.15542 -0.1420 0.88709  
Interest coverage ratio (ICR) 0.0202323 0.0111783 1.8100 0.07030 * 
Cash flow volatility (CFV) -0.462226 0.258679 -1.7869 0.07396 * 
Log Total assets (LogTA) -0.125592 0.227605 -0.5518 0.58109  
Total debt to total assets (DtoA) 0.337311 1.39455 0.2419 0.80887  
Market to book ratio (MB) -0.0888563 0.133487 -0.6657 0.50563  
Note. *** Significant at the 0.01 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, * Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
 
These results suggest that the level of reliability is associated with the uncertainty faced by investors who hold 
stocks in a specific firm. Market risk measured by firm’s beta (Beta) and financial risk measured by the interest 
coverage ratio (ICR) and cash flow volatility (CFV) are negatively associated with the reliability of stock 
recommendations. Although our analysis focused on stock recommendations rather than on the accuracy of 
earnings forecasts, the present findings seem to be consistent with other research which outlined that uncertainty 
in earnings forecasts is positively correlated to financial risk (Parkash, Dhaliwal, & Salatka, 1995). On the 
contrary, our research findings differ from other studies that did not find a significant explanatory power of the 
firm’s beta (Jaggi & Jain, 1998) and those that have identified a correlation between the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts and the number of analysts studying a firm (Parkash, Dhaliwal, & Salatka, 1995). 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed a sample of 5,443 stock recommendations issued by brokerage houses on 154 
companies listed on the Italian stock exchange between 2009 and 2013 in order to verify whether stock 
recommendations are confirmed by absolute stock returns and which firm-specific characteristics can explain the 
different level of reliability of stock recommendations for each firm.  
Two main findings emerge from the present research. First, descriptive statistics revealed a limited ability of 
stock recommendations to forecast absolute stock returns. Although the mean and the median of absolute stock 
returns following recommendations differ depending on positive, neutral and negative recommendations, 
research findings showed that a portion just over 50% of positive and negative recommendations were confirmed 
by absolute stock returns and that the level of reliability of stock recommendations for each firm are normally 
distributed around the mean of 54%. Second, explanatory variables which are statistically significant for the 
level of reliability seem to be connected in different ways to the uncertainty faced by investors who hold stocks 
in a specific firm. The reduction in uncertainty, as revealed by the positive value of the interest coverage ratio 
and the negative estimate of the firm’s beta and cash flow volatility, is associated with the increasing level of 
reliability of stock recommendations for each firm. 
These results enhance our overall understanding about the role of stock recommendations in providing reliable 
forecasts. More specifically, the information about the reliability of stock recommendations can help 
unsophisticated investors who are interested in absolute stock returns to improve their decision-making. 
Likewise, research findings may also be useful to firms in analysing investors’ behaviour in order to optimize 
their financial policy.  
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